

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

MICHAEL DUFFY, )  
 )  
 Plaintiff, )  
 )  
 v. ) Civ. No. 09-197-SLR  
 )  
 LOUIS NOVORO, LORI JAMES, and )  
 JOHN DILEVTERIO, )  
 )  
 Defendants. )

**MEMORANDUM ORDER**

At Wilmington this 20<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2009, having screened the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915;

IT IS ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, for the reasons that follow:

1. **Background.** Plaintiff Michael Duffy (“plaintiff”) filed this civil action pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. He appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

2. **Standard of Review.** When a litigant proceeds in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides that the court may dismiss a complaint, at any time, if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

3. The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim

pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on 12(b)(6) motions. *Courteau v. United States*, 287 F. App'x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (not published); *Allah v. Seiverling*, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); *Tourscher v. McCullough*, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)(applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). The court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff. *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, however, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” *Id.* at 555 (citations omitted). The “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” *Id.* (citations omitted).

4. Plaintiff is required to make a “showing” rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief. *Phillips v. County of Allegheny*, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). “[W]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only ‘fair notice,’ but also the ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” *Id.* (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3). Therefore, “stating . . . a

claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest' the required element." *Id.* at 235 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3). "This 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.'" *Id.* at 234. Because plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." *Erickson v. Pardus*, 127 S.Ct. at 2200 (citations omitted).

5. **Discussion.** Plaintiff alleges that defendants Louis Novoro ("Novoro"), Lori James ("James"), and John Dielevterio ("Dielevterio"), individuals in the offices of former United States Senator Biden, and current United States Senators Carper and Kaufman, respectively, discriminated against him on the basis of his disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. He also alleges defendants discriminated against him based upon the cultural distinctions of "Bay folk."

6. **ADA.** Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The term "public entity" does not include individuals, but is defined as: "(A) any State or local government; (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and (C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority (as defined in section 103(8) of the Rail Passenger Service Act [49

U.S.C. § 24102(4) ] ).” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(a). See *Zied-Campbell v. Richman*, Civ. No. 04-0026, 2007 WL 1031399, at \*16 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2007) (stating that the plain language of § 12132 applies only to public entities not individuals) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the court will dismiss the ADA claims against defendants as there is no individual liability available under Title II of the ADA and as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See *Emerson v. Thiel Coll.*, 296 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2002).

7. **Bay Folk.** Plaintiff's remaining claim of discrimination based upon his Bay folk heritage is frivolous.

8. **Conclusion.** For the above reasons, the complaint is dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Amendment of the complaint would be futile. See *Alston v. Parker*, 363 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2004); *Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.*, 293 F.3d 103, 111 (3d Cir. 2002); *Borelli v. City of Reading*, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976).

  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE