

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE**

END OF ROAD TRUST., et al.,)	
)	
Plaintiffs,)	
)	
v.)	C.A. No. 99-477 (GMS)
)	
TEREX CORPORATION, RANDOLPH)	
W. LENZ and MARVIN ROSENBERG,)	
)	
Defendants.)	
)	

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On September 22,1999, plaintiff End of the Road Trust (“ETR”) filed its complaint in this court. Discovery began in November 2000, but was stayed for 90 days after defendants were required to obtain new counsel due to a conflict. The defendants are now represented by Weil, Gotshal, and Manges. The plaintiffs are represented by Greenberg Traurig. The case is set for trial before this court on June 3, 2002.

Presently before the court is defendant Randolph Lenz’s Motion to Disqualify Greenberg and Traurig. Lenz argues that Greenberg Traurig violated Rule 1.7(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct by simultaneously representing Lenz in a Florida proceeding while representing ETR in this action. In its reply, ETR argues that the simultaneous representation was the result of an oversight as a result of the merging of Greenberg Traurig with the firm that initially represented Lenz. ETR further states that the Florida matter is ended and that the attorney who represented Lenz has been screened from this

representation. Finally, ETR argues that Lenz will suffer no prejudice as a result of Greenberg Traurig's continued representation, but that ETR may suffer prejudice if forced to find new counsel due to the complexity and age of the case. The court agrees with ETR and will, therefore, deny Lenz's motion for disqualification.

II. FACTS

ETR filed this complaint on behalf of Fruehauf Trailer Corporation, a bankrupt debtor. Defendant Lenz served as chair of Fruehauf's board of directors during the relevant period. ETR alleges that Lenz operated Fruehauf for his own interests and is asserting several causes of action against him. Most important for the present motion, ETR alleges that Lenz breached his fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).

When this action commenced, ETR was represented by Camhy, Karlinsky & Stein ("Camhy"). By July 2000, Greenberg Traurig and Camhy had entered into negotiations to discuss the possibility of merger. The firms agreed to merge on August 21, 2000. Camhy began winding up its affairs and both firms began a computerized conflicts check to determine any potential conflicts of interest between Greenberg Traurig and Camhy clients.

On July 12, 2000, prior to the Greenberg Traurig/Camhy merger, Lenz was sued by Equity Merchant Banking Corporation and the Connecticut Bank of Commerce in Florida state court ("the Florida action"). Lenz hired the Miami office of Greenberg Traurig to represent him. On August 15, 2000, the Greenberg Traurig attorneys filed motions to dismiss the Florida action. Greenberg Traurig's Miami office continued to represent Lenz until he terminated the representation on October 12, 2000. Lenz was never

aware - and Greenberg Traurig never notified him - that there was a potential conflict of interest in his continued representation.

Lenz allegedly learned of the conflict when his former counsel - Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom - notified him on March 14, 2001. Lenz's personal attorney, Thomas Gallagher, wrote Greenberg Traurig on that same day regarding the conflict. Greenberg Traurig responded that there had been no simultaneous representation, and that it did not seek a waiver from Lenz because he had terminated the representation. Greenberg Traurig asserts that the conflict was inadvertently overlooked in the conflicts check process.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Ethical Standard & The Court's Disciplinary Power

An attorney's conduct is measured by the ethical standards of the court before which the attorney appears. *See In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig.*, 748 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir. 1984). Pursuant to Local Rule 83.6(d)(2), the District of Delaware has adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Model Rule 1.7(a) provides that an attorney may not represent two clients when representation of one would be "directly adverse" to or would "materially limit" representation of the other, unless the attorney "reasonably believes" that the representation of the other would not be "adversely affected" and both clients consent to the representation. *See Elonex I.P. Holdings v. Apple Computer*, 142 F.Supp.2d 579, 582 (D. Del 2001) (citing *Lease v. Rubacky*, 987 F. Supp. 406, 407 (E.D. Pa. 1997)).

The court has the power to supervise the professional conduct of attorneys appearing before it. *See United States v. Miller*, 624 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir. 1980). This includes the power to disqualify

an attorney. *Id.* Nevertheless, motions to disqualify are generally disfavored. *See Cohen v. Oasin*, 844 F. Supp. 1965, 1067 (E.D. Pa. 1994). The party seeking disqualification must clearly demonstrate that “continued representation would be impermissible.” *Id.* Thus, “[v]ague and unsupported allegations are not sufficient to meet this standard.” *Id.*

Greenberg Traurig does not argue that its conduct was appropriate under Rule 1.7(a). Rather, the firm argues that “[d]isqualification is not an appropriate sanction for what, at most, was a brief, harmless, and unintended oversight of the rules of professional responsibility.” (D.I. 91 at 2.) Thus, the court’s inquiry is limited to whether disqualification is appropriate in this case.

B. Greenberg Traurig Should not be Disqualified

Although Greenberg Traurig admits that it violated Rule 1.7(a), this alone will not warrant disqualification. Contrary to Lenz’s arguments, disqualification is not automatic. *See Elonex*, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 583 (“Although disqualification is ordinarily the result of a finding that an ethical rule has been violated, disqualification is never automatic.”) (quoting *Miller*, 624 F.2d at 1201.) Indeed, the court has “wide discretion in framing its sanctions to be just and fair to all parties involved.” *Id.*

In *In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litigation*, the Third Circuit indicated that it had “often employed a balancing test in determining the appropriateness of disqualification of an attorney.” *Corn Derivatives*, 748 F.2d at 162. In the *Miller* case, the Third Circuit noted that:

[T]he court should disqualify an attorney only when it determines, on the facts of a particular case, that disqualification is an appropriate means of enforcing the applicable disciplinary rule. It should consider the ends that the disciplinary rule is designed to serve and any countervailing policies, such as permitting a litigant to retain counsel of his choice and enabling attorneys to practice without excessive restrictions.

Miller, 624 F.2d at 1201.

Rule 1.7(a) was enacted to prevent divided loyalties and to protect against the disclosure of client confidences. *See IBM v. Levin*, 579 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978). Neither policy is implicated here. Lenz alleges that Greenberg Traurig's loyalty was divided during the simultaneous representation. Although this is arguably true, Greenberg Traurig has not represented Lenz since October 2000. If Greenberg Traurig currently represented both clients, its loyalty might be more questionable. Since Lenz is no longer represented by Greenberg Traurig, however, the danger of divided loyalty is not as great, if it is present at all.

Lenz also argues that there is a danger that confidential information will be exchanged between the attorneys that represented him in the Florida action and ETR's attorneys. His concern arises from his assertion that the Florida action is connected to the ERISA claims in this case. Nevertheless, the court finds that the potential for breached confidences is minimal. First, the attorneys that represented Lenz worked in Greenberg Traurig's Miami office, whereas ETR is represented by attorneys in the New York office. The geographic separation militates against a finding that confidential information will be shared. *See Elonex*, 142 F.Supp.2d at 584 (noting that work was "done out of different offices in different cities"). Second, although Lenz argues that the ethical screen employed by Greenberg Traurig will be ineffective, a party seeking disqualification cannot rest on "[v]ague and unsupported allegations." *Id.* In this case, Lenz has not alleged sufficient facts that would permit the court to find that there is a specific or immediate danger that confidential information will be released, or that it has been released in the past. In the absence of such allegations, the court gives Lenz's arguments little weight.

The court further finds that strong countervailing policies weigh against disqualification. First,

although Greenberg Traurig arguably did violate Rule 1.7(a), the violation was of an extremely short duration, and was, apparently, inadvertent. Moreover, Lenz has not put forward a single fact or argument that would permit the court to find that he would be prejudiced by Greenberg Traurig's continued representation of ETR. Conversely, great prejudice will result to ETR if Lenz's motion is granted. This is a complex case. It is over two years old, and Greenberg Traurig has invested a substantial amount of time and effort. Moreover, the trial date is imminent. At this point, disqualifying Greenberg Traurig would further delay this case because new counsel will incur great difficulty in reviewing the case, completing discovery, writing any dispositive motions, and preparing for trial by June 3, 2002. This difficulty implicates the interests of both fairness and judicial economy. On balance, therefore, even if the policy concerns raised by Rule 1.7 (a) were implicated, the countervailing policy arguments weigh heavily against disqualification.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that disqualification is inappropriate and unnecessary. The court will, therefore, deny Lenz's Motion to Disqualify Greenberg Traurig.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant Lenz's Motion to Disqualify Greenberg Traurig (D.I. 81) is DENIED.

Dated: February 20, 2002

Gregory M. Sleet
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE